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Abstract 
In this paper, we will discuss what is called “Manifestation 
Challenge” to semantic realism, which was originally developed 
by Michael Dummett and has been further refined by Crispin 
Wright. According to this challenge, semantic realism has to 
meet the requirement that knowledge of meaning must be 
publically manifested in linguistic behaviour. In this regard, we 
will introduce and evaluate John McDowell’s response to this 
anti-realistic challenge, which was put forward to show that the 
challenge cannot undermine realism. According to McDowell, 
knowledge of undecidable sentences’ truth-conditions can be 
properly manifested in our ordinary practice of asserting such 
sentences under certain circumstances, and any further 
requirement will be redundant. Wright’s further objection to 
McDowell’s response will be also discussed and it will be 
argued that this objection fails to raise any serious problem for 
McDowell’s response and that it is an implausible objection in 
general. 
Key words: Dummett, Wright, McDowell, Manifestation Challenge, 
Semantic Realism. 
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The Later Wittgenstein vs. Frege on Linguistic Understanding 
Frege introduces two important semantic properties for linguistic 
expressions; sense and reference (see Frege, 1892). The reference, or 
Bedeutung, of a name is the object designated by the name, and the 
reference, or as it is sometimes called the semantic value, of a sentence is 
one of its truth values (see e.g. Frege, 1892: 63). On the other hand, the 
sense of a sentence is what is grasped by a speaker when he understands 
the sentence, and understanding the senses of the sentence’s parts is 
fulfilled by a grasp of their contribution to the sense of the sentence as a 
whole. The sense of a linguistic expression is said to be a way of 
representing, describing, or determining its semantic value. The sense of a 
sentence is what is called “thought” by Frege (see Frege, 1892: 62; 1956: 
292). For him, one of the most important features of senses is their being 
objective, which in turn points to the features such as being timeless, 
unchangeable, existent independently of the subject or thinker, and 
communicable between speakers.1 Therefore, if we take the sense of a 
sentence to be the conditions under which the sentence is true, i.e. its 
truth-conditions, the Fregean “semantic realism” can be summarized as 
the view that our understanding of the meaning of sentences consists in 
our knowledge of their objective truth-conditions.2  
The early Wittgenstein was inspired by Frege. As Kripke summarizes 
his view, the most basic doctrine in Tractatus is that: “a declarative 
sentence gets its meaning by virtue of its truth conditions, by virtue of its 
correspondence to facts that must obtain if it is true” (1982: 72). Although 
there are differences between the early Wittgenstein’s and Frege’s 
philosophy,3 it is important to note that, for Wittgenstein, proposition 
should be conceived of as being intrinsically a picture of reality, states of 
affairs, or facts. Because of that, “to understand a proposition means to 
know what is the case if it is true” (Wittgenstein, 1922: §4.024). This 
means that, generally speaking, understanding a sentence consists in 
knowing its truth-conditions. As a result, the sort of truth-conditional 
approach to meaning is, in one way or another, admitted by the early 
Wittgenstein and, insofar as this truth-conditional approach and the reality 
of the realm of senses are concerned, we can say that Wittgenstein is 
following Frege’s main doctrines on meaning and linguistic 
understanding. 
The later Wittgenstein, however, is taken to be proposing a 
completely different picture of meaning and understanding.4 In Malcolm’s 
view (1986), the later Wittgenstein attempted to criticize the view that 
understanding the sense of a sentence is to understand the contribution of 
its constituent parts, that is, that our understanding is hidden within the 
words of language. Instead, according to the Investigations, what we need 
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is the knowledge of the circumstances under which the sentence is used. 
As a consequence, “the meaning of a word is its use in the language” 
(Wittgenstein, 1953: §43). According to this alternative Wittgensteinian 
picture of linguistic understanding, our understanding of words does not 
anymore consist in our knowledge of the truth-conditions of the sentences 
in which they occur; rather, as Wittgenstein points out, “to understand a 
sentence means to understand a language. To understand a language 
means to master a technique” (Ibid, §199). To learn such a technique, one 
must grasp the wide agreement across a speech community on that 
activity: “Here the term ‘language-game’ is meant to bring into 
prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity” 
(Ibid, §23). This activity requires the presence of other speakers, as 
Malcolm clarifies, “if there was no we – if there was no agreement among 
those who have had the same training, so to what are the correct steps in 
particular cases when following a rule – then there would be no wrong 
steps, or indeed any right ones” (1986: 156).5 As a result, for a solitary 
speaker considered in isolation, there would be no genuine distinction 
between what seems right to him and what is actually right. Rather, we 
need a speech community for such correctness conditions to appear: a 
speaker can be judged to be correctly following a rule only if his linguistic 
usage conforms to the customary pattern used by other users of that 
language. In this way, there can be no private language. As Wittgenstein 
states, “‘following a rule’ is a practice. And to believe one is following a 
rule is not following the rule. Hence one cannot follow a rule ‘privately’: 
otherwise believing he was following a rule would be the same as 
following it” (Wittgenstein, 1953: §202).  
The question now is whether Frege’s/the early Wittgenstein’s 
conception of meaning is compatible with the later Wittgenstein’s. This 
leads to the question whether the sort of realism, which, regarding its 
different strengths, Frege and the early Wittgenstein advocated, can be 
seen to have any compatibility with the later Wittgenstein’s main 
doctrines about meaning properly conceived? As we saw, the standard 
reading of the early and the later Wittgenstein’s views treats them as 
radically divergent so that the later Wittgenstein seems to be entirely 
abandoning Frege’s main doctrines on meaning and linguistic 
understanding, together with the metaphysical view, i.e. realism, which he 
himself allegedly held in the Tractatus.6 However, while the standard 
interpretation of the early Wittgenstein/Frege and the later Wittgenstein 
takes them as proposing incompatible views, it is not the thought that all 
philosophers commonly endorse. Dummett/Wright and McDowell are the 
two main figures in the contemporary philosophy of language supporting 
a different reading of Wittgenstein’s works, though the way they allow 
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Frege’s and the later Wittgenstein’s views to be put together amounts to 
different interesting views. We will start by introducing Dummett’s view 
first. 
 
Dummett on Semantic Realism 
Michael Dummett and, following him, Crispin Wright are the 
philosophers who think Frege’s and the later Wittgenstein’s main theses 
on meaning and linguistic understanding are not necessarily incompatible, 
though if they are combined, the outcome of such a combination is an 
“anti-realist” theory of meaning. Dummett was inspired by both Frege and 
the later Wittgenstein. His extensive writings on Frege’s philosophy cover 
both criticism as well as admiration of the main doctrines of Frege on 
meaning (see e.g. Dummett, 1973a, 1973b, 1991a, 1991b, 1981a). At the 
same time, he appreciates the later Wittgenstein’s slogan that “meaning is 
use” (see e.g. Dummett, 1976: 36, 91; 1979: 108, 113, 116; 1989: 179-
180; 1991c: 305-306). Dummett believes that “Frege’s thesis that sense is 
objective [in the sense of being intrinsically fully communicable] is thus 
implicitly an anticipation […] of Wittgenstein’s doctrine that meaning is 
use […]: yet Frege never drew the consequences of this for the form 
which the sense of a word may take” (1976: 91; see also Dummett, 1981b: 
245; 1973a: 682). Although Dummett is considered as one of the most 
important admirers of Frege’s philosophy, his theory of meaning, or 
better, his theory of understanding,7 is a full attempt in rejecting the 
realistic view of meaning and understanding, that is, a rejection of the 
realist belief that truth-conditions can be considered as evidence-
transcendent. 
Dummett starts his criticism of realism by saying that realism 
problematically implies a notion of evidence-transcendent truth, which is 
a highly controversial claim for him. According to Dummett, first of all, 
realism can be defined “as the belief that statement of disputed class 
[undecidable sentences] possess an objective truth-value, independently of 
our means of knowing it: they are true or false in virtue of a reality 
exciting independently of us” (Dummett, 1963: 146). This definition can 
indeed be regarded as the definition of semantic realism, which, for 
Dummett, is the only sense in which we can investigate realism.8 On his 
account, semantic realism is the doctrine, associated with Frege, that our 
sentential understanding consists in our knowledge of sentences’ truth-
conditions, where truth is treated as potentially evidence-transcendent or 
epistemically unconstrained. What is Dummett’s problem with such a 
view? 
Dummett rejects the claim that our understanding of sentences can 
consist in a grasp of their potentially evidence-transcendent truth-
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conditions. Dummett’s version of anti-realism implies the view that our 
understanding of a sentence should be characterized in terms of the way 
that sentence can be properly used, or more particularly, in terms of the 
conditions under which its truth or falsity can be verified or its assertion 
can be warranted by the availability of enough evidence.9 For Dummett, 
the realist conception of the meaning of certain sentences cannot be 
reconciled with Wittgenstein’s widely conceded insight about linguistic 
understanding. Dummett reads Wittgenstein’s slogan that “meaning is 
use” as the doctrine that “the knowledge in which a speaker’s 
understanding of a sentence consists must be capable of being fully 
manifested by his linguistic practice” (1979: 116). However, semantic 
realists defend the view that understanding a sentence consists in our 
grasp of its potentially evidence-transcendent truth-conditions. To see the 
problem better, we should consider the way Dummett distinguishes 
between decidable and undecidable sentences: decidable sentences are the 
sentences “for which a speaker has some effective procedure which will, 
in a finite time, put him into a position in which he can recognize whether 
or not the conditions for the truth of the sentence is satisfied” (Dummett, 
1976: 45). In contrast, for undecidable sentences, we do not have such 
defined procedure, for example, the sentence “Cyrus the Great smiled 
before his death”, by supposing that he dies alone, is an undecidable 
sentence. Dummett’s concern now is: how can we grasp the truth-
conditions of undecidable sentences if such conditions are potentially 
evidence-transcendent? If our linguistic understanding is defined as 
above, it is implausible to think that we can fully manifest our knowledge 
of such sentences’ truth-conditions.10 Dummett, at some point, completely 
rejected the idea that our understanding of declarative sentences consists 
in a grasp of their truth-conditions. He, hence, by appealing to 
Wittgensteinian conception of linguistic understanding, tried to show that 
semantic realism presents a wrong picture of sentential understanding. We 
can summarize these remarks into Dummett’s “Manifestation 
Argument”,11 which aims to reject semantic realism altogether, as 
Dummett points out “it is, in fact, plain that the knowledge, which is being 
ascribed to one who is said to understand the [undecidable] sentence, is 
knowledge which transcends the capacity to manifest that knowledge by 
the way in which the sentence is used. The [semantic realist’s] theory of 
meaning cannot be a theory in which meaning is fully determined by use” 
(1973a: 225). Hence, according to the manifestation argument as proposed 
by Dummett, (1) if (undecidable) sentences had evidence-transcendent 
(i.e., realistic) truth-conditions, we could manifest our knowledge of these 
conditions in our use of these sentences; (2) such knowledge cannot be so 
manifested; (3) therefore, (undecidable) sentences have no evidence-
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transcendent (realistic) truth-conditions.12 In the next section, we will get 
to Wright’s more accurate and plausible characterization of this argument 
and, in Section 4, we will see that the main debate between McDowell and 
Wright concerns the second premise of this argument. 
Therefore, Dummett’s manifestation argument against semantic 
realism aims to show that our sentential understanding does not consist in 
a grasp of potentially evidence-transcendent truth-conditions.13 Rather 
such an understanding should be associated with assertability conditions, 
i.e. the conditions under which that sentence can be properly used for the 
purpose of asserting something specific. In fact, in his view, what should 
be constrained in the truth-conditional conception of meaning is the 
concept of truth, which is, in the realistic view, an epistemically 
unconstrained notion.14 Therefore, he adheres to both the truth-conditional 
conception of meaning and the manifestability principle, while he limits 
the concept of truth and treats the truth of a sentence as evidentially 
constrained. This is the reason why Dummett claimed that, although a 
plausible theory of meaning can have as one of its main components a 
theory of Fregean sense, the idea that the concept of truth can be taken as 
a primitive and epistemically unconstrained concept should be rejected 
(see Dummett, 1976: 35; 1979: 116). Thereby, he defends “full-blooded” 
theories of meaning, in contrast with “modest” ones, regarding the way 
the concept of truth is deployed in such theories. In modest theories, the 
famous proponent of which is McDowell, truth is treated as a primitive 
concept, no explanation of which is forthcoming (see e.g. McDowell, 
1977). In Dummett’s favored full-blooded theory, however, the key facts 
about content must not be presupposed in advance; instead, the theory has 
to provide us with an account of the basic predicates and referring terms 
of the language (see Dummett, 1975: 5-6, 21). Dummett’s considerations 
on this matter require us to search for a theory of meaning in which, 
firstly, “meaning is not directly given in terms of the condition for a 
sentence to be true, but for it to be verified; and, secondly, that the notion 
of truth, when it is introduced, must be explained, in some manner, in 
terms of our capacity to recognize statements as true, and not in terms of a 
condition which transcends human capacities” (Dummett, 1976: 75).15 In 
what follows, we will consider the way Wright characterizes Dummett’s 
challenge for semantic realism. 
 
Wright on the Manifestation Challenge 
Wright, however, does not see the manifestation “argument” as entirely 
ruling out semantic realism. According to Wright’s reading, Dummett’s 
manifestation argument can be regarded as a “challenge” for semantic 
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realists, a challenge concerning whether a coherent and consistent realistic 
view can be extracted from a combination of the following beliefs:  
(I) The Truth-Conditional Conception of Understanding: “the thesis 
that what constitutes an understanding of any declarative sentence is a 
knowledge of its truth-conditions” (Wright, 1993: 247-248). To illustrate, 
in Frege’s view, the sense of a sentence is what is grasped by someone 
who understands the sentence. The sense of a sentence, or its thought, was 
considered by Frege as the way the sentence’s reference is presented, i.e. 
its truth or falsity (Frege, 1892: 62; 1956: 292). Thus, we can take the 
sense of a sentence as its truth-conditions, the conditions under which the 
sentence is true or false (see Miller, 2007: 34). Therefore, the truth-
conditional conception of meaning and understanding turns into the 
doctrine that our understanding of a sentence consists in our knowledge of 
its truth-conditions.  
(II) The Wittgensteinian Conception of Linguistic Understanding: 
Wittgenstein’s view of meaning as use leads to a particular conception of 
the nature of understanding, according to which linguistic understanding 
consists in a practical knowledge, or an ability about how to use a 
language: “To understand a language means to be master of a technique” 
(Wittgenstein, 1953: §199); it is not, thus, something like a hidden mental 
process, but a know-how ability that has to be displayed in our actions. 
Therefore, “understanding an expression is knowing its proper use, and 
such knowledge consists in a complex of practical abilities [… which] are 
essentially abilities to perform appropriately in public” (Wright, 1993: 
247). The key point here is that exercising the practical abilities to use a 
language must be publicly evaluable as correct or incorrect, right or 
wrong, by others. Linguistic understanding, therefore, should be 
associated only with the abilities which we are capable of publicly 
manifesting, as Wright points out:  
The performance abilities that constitutes an understanding of an 
expression count for nothing unless associated with the ability to evaluate 
one’s own and other’s performance with that expression. So 
understanding, if it is to be viewed as a practical ability at all, has to see as 
a complex of discriminatory capacities: an overall ability intentionally to 
suit one’s use of the expression to the obtaining of factors which can be 
appropriated by oneself and others to render one’s use apt. (1989: 247) 
Now, as discussed above, we can summarize this commitment as 
follows: understanding a sentence consists in having certain practical 
abilities to use that sentence, e.g., to recognize whether and how the use of 
the sentence is appropriate and justified; Wright calls this belief the 
“Manifestability Principle” (Ibid, 247).  
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(III) Truth Is Potentially Evidence-Transcendent: This claim states 
that it is possible for a sentence to have truth-conditions detecting the 
obtaining which may go beyond our abilities. Sentences may be true or 
false undetectably, i.e., even when we are not able to gather any evidence 
for their truth-value. In other words, sentences have realist, potentially 
evidence-transcendent truth-conditions, not the truth-conditions which if 
obtain their obtaining can be verified.  
According to Wright, the first two beliefs “are not in overt tension 
exactly” (1993: 248). If someone wishes to reconcile these two theses, he 
has to show that “knowing the truth-conditions of the sentence has to be a 
state which somehow guarantees possession of various abilities, and the 
question must, therefore be acknowledged how the guarantee is sustained” 
(Ibid). However, while the first two principles are not in serious tension, 
“it is when the third ingredient [...] is introduced that a real tension is 
generated” (Ibid). The problem is that when we combine the first two 
theses with the third one, we reach the claim that understanding a sentence 
consists in knowing its truth-conditions that are potentially evidence-
transcendent. Wright’s demand of realists is to introduce a practical ability 
showing our knowledge of such truth-conditions. What can such practical 
abilities be? And, how can having such abilities be manifested? Wright 
has suggestions about the general form of such ability: 
The Manifestability Principle bids us to view the understanding of 
declarative sentences as a complex of abilities, and the truth-conditional 
conception seems to superimpose a unifying frame, to postulate a thread 
which runs through the evidence-sifting, inferential, and other abilities 
involve in understanding the sentence and somehow binds them together. 
Knowing the truth-conditions of the sentences has to be a state, which 
somehow guarantees possession of these abilities. (Wright, 1989: 54) 
Here, we need to pay attention to Wright’s distinction between “core 
abilities” and “neighbourhood abilities”. Neighbourhood abilities are the 
abilities such as the ability to gather and select relevant evidence for 
sentences, to be able to recognize inferences to and from such sentences, 
to be able to use them to attribute proper beliefs to people, and so forth. 
For example, if we understand the sentence “it’s raining”, then we are able 
to collect some evidence for whether or not it is raining outside, we can 
infer that the street is thereby wet, and we are able to attribute the belief to 
the speaker that it’s raining, and so on. Core abilities, for Wright, seem to 
be recognitional abilities, e.g., the ability to recognize whether or not it is 
raining outside, which are manifestable and which guarantee the 
possession of the neighbourhood abilities. Regarding the sentence “that is 
salty”, Wright introduces the core ability to understand such a sentence as 
the ability to “recognize the taste of the samples by placing them in one’s 
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mouth, and thereby verify or falsify descriptions of their taste” (1993: 17). 
Using the sentence “that is salty” is, hence, a sign of having such a 
recognitional ability. Therefore, we can recognize what makes “that is 
salty” true, i.e., that thing being salty, by recognizing the taste of it. The 
core ability, in the case of truth-conditional conception of understanding, 
hence, becomes the ability to recognize the truth-value of the sentence, 
which can be identified with the knowledge of the sentence’s truth-
conditions. Therefore, in the case of decidable sentences, the first two 
beliefs, (I) and (II), can be combined: “Plausibly, then, in the case of such 
judgements [decidable sentences], the Manifestability Principle and Truth-
Condition Conception can be made to coherent perfectly. Grasp of such 
judgments’ truth-condition will be a manifestable, recognitional skill, and 
there will be a case for regarding it as constitutive of an understanding of 
them” (Ibid, 251).   
However, Wright’s problem is that “nothing at all corresponds to 
abilities of this kind in the case of statements for which the anti-realist 
finds the realist’s account of understanding problematic” (Ibid, 17), 
namely, the case of undecidable sentences. What realists must do here is 
to introduce some core ability, which constitutes our understanding of the 
undecidable sentences as knowing their potentially evidence-transcendent 
truth-conditions. This is the challenge the realists should overcome if they 
wish to propose a consistent view: “The anti-realist challenge to the realist 
is now: explain how your conception of understanding can be made to 
harmonize with Wittgenstein’s insight” (Ibid, 16). In Wright’s view, an 
anti-realist does not face such a problem regarding the mentioned three 
beliefs and has two easy options: either a “rejection of the Truth-
Conditional Conception of statement understanding [a rejection of the first 
belief], or its retention subject to constraint that the ‘truth’ in ‘truth-
conditions’ denote an evidentially constrained notion [a revision of the 
third belief]” (Ibid, 249). According Wright, Dummett’s and Wright’s 
own earlier discussions presupposed that “truth is nothing if not classical 
(evidence transcendent) and hence that the Truth-Conditional Conception 
has to be supplanted by something in which warranted assertion, or 
perhaps verification, plays the central role” (Ibid, 249). Later, he decides 
to support a revision of our conception of truth as epistemically 
unconstrained, that is, he goes for the second option mentioned above.16 
McDowell, however, has a different way to cope with this challenge. 
 
McDowell’s Response to the Manifestation Challenge 
In “Anti-realism and the Epistemology of Understanding” (1981), 
McDowell responds to the above anti-realistic challenge.17 In order to see 
his response in a clearer way, we need to consider the platitude he insists 
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there is between the content of an assertion and the truth-conditions of the 
sentence we use to assert that content: “There is a truistic connection 
between the notion of the content of an assertion and a familiar notion of 
truth [...]; the connection guarantees, as the merest platitude, that a correct 
specification of what can be asserted, by the assertoric utterance of a 
sentence, cannot but be a specification of a condition under which the 
sentence is true” (1981: 319). In this regard, what McDowell is interested 
in is a platitudinous connection between what we assert and the truth-
conditions of the sentence we use to make that assertion. McDowell 
continues: “Knowledge of what a sentence can be used to assert is 
knowledge that can be directly manifested, on appropriate occasions, by 
using the sentence in such a way as manifestly to assert precisely that” 
(Ibid, 321-322). We expect from a competent speaker of a language to be 
able to use his language’s sentences to make certain assertions. For 
instance, such a competent speaker by using the sentence “snow is white” 
asserts that snow is white. McDowell’s claim is that what the speaker 
knows when he asserts something (i.e. that snow is white) is simply 
manifestable in his ability to use that sentence for making that assertion. 
McDowell, then, states: “Specifications of contents of potential assertions 
are, by way of our platitude, specifications of conditions under which the 
sentences used to effect those assertions would be true” (Ibid, 321-322). 
By means of McDowell’s platitude and regarding his claim that our 
knowledge of the content of our assertions is manifestable in our use of 
the sentence, we reach the claim that our knowledge of the content of our 
assertions consists in our knowledge of the truth-conditions of the 
sentence, which we are using for making that assertion. Hence, when the 
competent speaker uses the sentence “snow is white” to assert the specific 
content that snow is white, this content of that assertion, or of the asserted 
sentence, is, on the basis of McDowell’s platitude, the conditions under 
which that sentence would be true or false. We have thereby arrived at 
nothing but the truth-conditional conception of understanding: if a speaker 
understands a sentence, he knows the truth-conditions of the sentence and 
the knowledge of the truth-conditions is manifested by the speaker’s 
ability to use the sentence to assert what he knows. McDowell’s platitude, 
hence, allowed us to combine the truth-conditional conception of 
linguistic understanding with the Wittgensteinian manifestability 
principle.  
But, McDowell has not yet provided a justification for the inclusion 
of the third belief, namely, that the truth-conditions of undecidable 
sentences are potentially evidence-transcendent. McDowell deals with this 
part by making the following claim:  
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Now if a sentence lacks an effective decision procedure, then the 
condition that any competent speaker knows he would be asserting to 
obtain if he used the sentence in order to make an assertion – which is in 
fact a condition under which the sentence would be true [...] – is ex 
hypothesi not a condition whose obtaining, if it does obtain, a competent 
speaker can be sure of being able to put himself in a position to recognize. 
(1981: 322)  
What McDowell, by appealing to the assertion-truth platitude, seeks 
to show here is that competent speakers are able to use undecidable 
sentences to make assertions and they thereby manifest their knowledge of 
the conditions under which those sentences would be true, although for 
these conditions we have no evidence or finite procedure which can help 
verify or falsify them. Competent speakers are able to manifest their 
knowledge of the truth-conditions of undecidable sentences by their 
ability to assert them via using those sentences, though the truth-
conditions are potentially evidence-transcendent. This simply leads us to 
the following realistic conclusion: “we seem to have equipped ourselves 
with a kind of realism: a description of linguistic competence that makes 
central use of the idea that speakers have a knowledge of conditions that 
they are not, in general, capable of recognizing whenever they obtain” 
(McDowell, 1981: 322). That is to say, competent speakers’ 
understanding of undecidable sentences consists in their grasp of the 
sentences’ truth-conditions, which if they obtain, we may not be in 
principle capable of detecting. In this sense, we come up with a realistic 
view which most importantly accommodates the claim that undecidable 
sentences possess potentially evidence-transcendent truth-conditions and 
our knowledge of such truth-conditions is manifestable in our ability to 
use such sentences to make certain assertions. 
 
Evaluating McDowell’s Response 
The important question I seek an answer to in this part is whether 
McDowell’s response to anti-realists’ challenge is successful. McDowell 
introduced the practical ability Wright asked for by introducing the 
platitude, namely, the ability to use a sentence in order to assert a specific 
content, which is in turn the condition under which the sentence would be 
true. For example, I may use the sentence “John was brave” to assert that 
John was brave. John, let’s suppose, died two years ago and I have, would 
have, no evidence about whether John was really brave. McDowell’s 
suggestion is that when I use the sentence “John was brave” to assert that 
John was brave, such a use for making such an assertion manifests my 
knowledge of the conditions under which the sentence would be true, 
though I do not have any specific procedure to verify it. The assertability 
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conditions are the conditions under which the speaker feels justified to use 
a sentence in a certain way to make a specific assertion, for example, 
when the speaker agrees with others in her speech community on how to 
use certain words and sentences of her language to make certain 
assertions. A competent speaker of our linguistic community, who has the 
ability to use “John was brave” to make an assertion, can use the sentence 
to assert that John was brave and, for McDowell, by doing so the speaker 
has manifested her knowledge of the conditions under which such an 
undecidable sentence would be true. The reason again is that there is, 
according to McDowell, a platitudinous relation between making an 
assertion and saying the truth, that is, a platitudinous relation between 
making an assertion and expressing the conditions under which the 
sentence would be true. Therefore, understanding the sentence that is used 
by the speaker to make a certain assertion manifests the speaker’s 
knowledge of the sentence’s potentially evidence-transcendent truth-
conditions. 
Wright, however, does not seem to accept McDowell’s response as 
plausible. It is important to note that Wright concedes McDowell’s 
suggested platitudinous connection between assertions and truth, as 
Wright says, “someone, for instance, who understands ‘Jones is in pain’ 
will be credited, by the platitudinous reasoning, with a conception of a 
specific kind of state of affairs – Jones’ being in pain – whose obtaining 
he conceives as necessary and sufficient for the truth of that statement” 
(1993: 18-19). Consequently, “the platitudes may be allowed to reinstate 
‘knowledge of truth-conditions’ as a general description of the abilities 
which those who understand a statement thereby have” (Ibid, 19). 
Nevertheless, Wright raises the following objection: “How do we proceed 
from there to foist on him [the speaker] a conception of how such a state 
of affairs can obtain undetectably?” (Ibid). If the objection is true, then 
realists, especially McDowell, have failed to defend their position since 
the platitude does “nothing to justify the idea that the notion of truth 
which the reference therein to ‘truth-condition’ invokes is the realist’s 
objective truth” (Ibid). Wright’s objection, in other words, is that 
“somehow McDowell has – perfectly question-beggingly – run together 
lack of effective decidability with the capacity to be undetectably true” 
(Ibid, 19, fn. 7). Here is the place we can see a shift from a strong version 
of the manifestation argument to a weaker version of manifestation 
challenge.18 The claim is not anymore that the realist’s position is wrong 
or that a realist cannot combine the three mentioned beliefs to have a 
coherent view, as Wright confesses that “I have no general, conclusive 
proof that it cannot” (1989: 250). The challenge is rather that the ability 
McDowell introduced is not the ability that must be.19 Hence, McDowell 
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has so far achieved a success to push anti-realists back to a weaker version 
of their challenge. I am now going to argue that there are at least two 
problems with Wright’s objection to McDowell: not only does Wright’s 
objection imply an implausible demand of explanation, but it is also put 
forward by unjustifiably looking at the central problem from a radically 
different point of view. 
First of all, is Wright’s objection plausible? The problem, for Wright, 
is that McDowell’s response leaves it ambiguous and unexplained 
whether the truth-conditions we grasp are indeed realistic, that is, whether 
they are potentially evidence-transcendent. Wright seems to put forward 
the following argument to defeat McDowell’s response. Let’s take for 
granted the truth-conditional conception of understanding, according to 
which a competent speaker, when he understands a sentence, knows the 
conditions under which the sentence is true. Let’s assume McDowell’s 
platitude too, according to which such knowledge is manifested in the 
speaker’s ability to use the sentence to assert a specific content. In the 
case of undecidable sentences, such as “John was brave”, McDowell’s 
proposal was that when a speaker publically uses the mentioned sentence 
to assert that John was brave, he manifests his knowledge of this content, 
which is the knowledge of the condition under which that sentence would 
be true, though whether or not the truth-condition obtains may remain 
forever undetectable. Wright’s objection is that if our understanding of 
such an undecidable sentence consists in our knowledge of its truth-
conditions, then the realists must tell us not only that the speaker knows 
under what conditions the sentence would be true, but also that he knows 
or has “an understanding of how it could be undetectably true” (Wright, 
1993: 248), that is to say, a conception of what it is for the truth-
conditions to be evidence-transcendent. McDowell’s suggestion, 
according to Wright, does not show that the speaker has such a 
conception. As a result, Wright concludes that McDowell has failed to 
justify his claim that our grasp of the truth-conditions is realistic or 
potentially evidence-transcendent.  
This demand, however, seems redundant and implausible. McDowell 
indeed could respond to Wright by claiming that we can expect from a 
competent user of English to be able to use the sentence “John was brave” 
to assert that John was brave. She knows, as we expect, under what 
conditions that sentence would be true, though there is in principle no 
specific procedure to verify the truth of that sentence. While this demand 
or expectation from a competent speaker is reasonable and plausible, it 
does not seem plausible to ask from the speaker: Do you know what it is 
for the truth-condition of your sentence to be evidence-transcendent? Do 
you really understand what it is for truth to be epistemically 
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unconstrained? Do you indeed know what it is for the truth-conditions of 
your sentence to be realistically objective? It is not something that we 
expect from a normal, competent member of our speech community to 
know and, hence, it is not plausible to seek an ability to manifest such sort 
of knowledge, that is, it is not plausible to claim that “knowing the 
[potentially evidence-transcendent] truth-conditions of a sentence may 
require an understanding of how it could be undetectably true”, as Wright 
is claiming (Ibid, 248).20 We should note that it is not even plausible to 
require something similar from an anti-realist account, though I think 
McDowell could potentially use Wright’s objection against Wright’s own 
view. The reason is that, according to an anti-realist account, truth is 
epistemically constrained so that a speaker knows a sentence is true by 
following a procedure which in principle guarantees a proof of the truth or 
falsity of the sentence. Now, having taken for granted the anti-realist 
view, is it plausible to demand, from a speaker, to know what it is for the 
truth of a sentence to be evidentially constrained or to be epistemically 
constrained? Is it an acceptable argument against anti-realism? The 
answer is negative. Neither for a realist, nor for an anti-realist, has 
meeting what Wright demands had any justification. This leads to the 
second extra problem, which I am going to discuss below and which I 
think is concealed in the dispute between McDowell and Wright. 
The manifestability principle, it is conceded by Dummett, Wright, 
and McDowell, is a Wittgensteinian doctrine. McDowell, it seems, would 
claim that not only do I respect the Wittgensteinian manifestability 
principle, but I am also a believer of another fundamental doctrine of the 
Investigations, that is, Wittgenstein’s therapeutic approach to 
philosophical problems, which seems to be neglected by Wright in this 
dispute. Wittgenstein’s therapeutic or diagnostic view can be taken as a 
rejection of “the view that there were any real philosophical problems to 
be solved. They were themselves the result of misunderstanding language 
and could be eased or explained away by proper attention to our use of 
words, rather than answered on their own terms” (Thornton, 2004: 2). 
This therapeutic view does not allow for theorizing and philosophizing 
beyond what can be achieved from concentrating on actual linguistic 
practices in our linguistic community. What competent speakers of our 
linguistic society manifest is their ability to assert something by using a 
certain sentence. McDowell’s platitude just implies that this manifestation 
is a manifestation of the knowledge of the truth-conditions’ of the used 
sentence. Once we are in agreement with this platitude, Wittgenstein’s 
therapeutic view prevents us from going any further and asking for a sort 
of knowledge more than that. By insisting on more explanation, we will 
inevitably engage ourselves in philosophical misunderstandings. 
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McDowell seems to stop explaining anything else after proposing the 
platitude, as his Wittgensteinian therapeutic approach implies. We may 
clarify this idea by emphasizing that what the competent speakers of 
language are required to know is a know-how, rather than a know-that 
kind of knowledge: they have the ability, or know how, to use a sentence 
to assert something specific; they are not required to know that the truth-
conditions of those sentences are potentially evidence-transcendent. It 
seems that Wright by the demand of introducing a manifestable ability 
constituting our knowledge of what it is for truth-conditions to be 
evidence-transcendent violates this Wittgensteinian therapeutic principle, 
a principle that underlies McDowell’s philosophy. As anti-realists accuse 
realists to be violating the manifestability principle, which indeed 
McDowell respects, McDowell could accuse anti-realists to be violating 
Wittgenstein’s therapeutic view, that is, to accept a part of Wittgenstein’s 
view but unjustifiably abandoning the other interconnected part. Now, if 
Wright wishes to challenge Wittgenstein’s therapeutic approach, it is 
Wittgenstein, rather than McDowell, that he has to face with. McDowell’s 
view, hence, keeps its coherence and consistency, unless Wright can 
justifiably convince us that the Wittgensteinian therapeutic approach is to 
be rejected and that the other parts of the later Wittgenstein’s view can be 
kept and defended by the anti-realists after the therapeutic approach is 
excluded.21 
 
Conclusion 
We can conclude that the debate between McDowell and Wright may not 
be simply settled by asking, from McDowell, to do more or, from Wright, 
to give up on some of his claims. This debate discloses a radical 
divergence between two readings of Wittgenstein, one of which attempts 
to revive Wittgenstein’s therapeutic view and the other resists it. If Wright 
really tends to challenge McDowell’s response, he should challenge either 
McDowell’s platitude or McDowell’s therapeutic view. But, Wright 
accepts the former and if he is challenging the latter, i.e. the 
Wittgensteinian therapeutic view, then it is one of the most important 
theses of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, rather than McDowell’s, which 
he is challenging. Finally, Wright’s objection, even if successful, does not 
show that semantic realism is wrong. Rather, it can only show that further 
attempts to resist the manifestation challenge is required. 
 
Notes 
1. We might separate the latter feature from the rest and thereby commit to two 
claims with different strength about the objectivity of senses: the weaker Fregean 
thesis states that we cannot successfully communicate with other people, unless 
we all grasp the same sense of sentences we utter. The stronger Fregean thesis 
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implies the idea that thoughts are strongly objective in that they can exist even 
without the existence of any speaker or communicator (see e.g. Frege, 1956: 308, 
311). 
2. Though, considering the above footnote, the strength of such a view depends 
on the strength of the concept of objectivity employed in the characterization of 
this view. 
3. For example, for Frege, sentences and names have sense as well as reference, 
while, for Wittgenstein, names have reference only (not sense). For instance, see 
(Wittgenstein, 1922: §3.203; §3.3; §4.001). 
4. However, it is not the case that there is a widespread consensus between 
philosophers on this matter; for a different view, see (Horwich, 2013). 
5. Malcolm praises Kripke’s claim that, for Wittgenstein, a speech community, or 
a social aspect, is essential, though he criticizes Kripke’s claim that 
Wittgenstein’s remarks lead to scepticism about meaning. Malcolm believes that 
the sceptical paradox is resolved by appealing to speakers’ action, rather than 
interpretation. See (Malcolm, 1986: 155). 
6. For other important interpretations of Wittgenstein, see e.g. (Hacker, 2001) and 
(Kenny, 2006). 
7. For Dummett, a theory of meaning has to be taken as a theory of understanding 
so that, in supplying a theory of meaning for a language, we must provide an 
account of “what is that someone knows when he knows the language, that is, 
when he knows the meanings of the expression and sentences of the language” 
(Dummett, 1975: 99). 
8. For Dummett, we cannot simply evaluate realism as a metaphysical doctrine 
since, in his view, pure metaphysical discussions are more metaphorical than 
philosophical (see Dummett, 1993a: xxv). Therefore, he prefers to discuss realism 
as a doctrine about our linguistic understanding of the sentences which, for 
semantic realists, have potentially evidence-transcendent truth-conditions.  
9. As Dummett describes, “For the anti-realist, an understanding of […] a 
statement consists in knowing what counts as evidence adequate for the assertion 
of the statement, and the truth of the statement can consist only in the existence of 
such evidence” (1963: 155). 
10. See (Dummett, 1993b: 98) for his discussion of what it is to be able to use the 
word “square” and what manifests this ability. 
11.See, e.g., (Dummett, 1973a, 1976, 1969, 1963, and 1959). 
12. Dummett at least has two, and on some readings three, different arguments 
against semantic realism: the acquisition argument and the manifestation 
argument, and a third argument which is called the endowment argument. 
According to the acquisition argument, (1) semantic realism implies the claim 
that our understanding of (undecidable) sentences is constituted by our 
knowledge of their potentially evidence-transcendent truth-conditions. (2) Our 
linguistic abilities are necessarily learnt by training from other speakers, where 
this training has taken place by engaging in recognizable situations, that is, by 
engaging in learning the use of our linguistic expressions in public situations. (3) 
Therefore, our linguistic abilities cannot go beyond what we were taught, that is, 
we cannot grasp evidence-transcendent (realistic) truth-conditions (see, Dummett 
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1969, especially 363-364). See also (Miller, 2003b). A third argument has also 
been attributed to Dummett in defense of anti-realism, which is called “the 
argument from endowment” (see Gifford, 2017: 82-88). According to this 
argument, (1) “if undecidable sentences have realist truth conditions, then we can 
endow undecidable sentences with realist truth conditions through the way that 
we use them. [(2)] We cannot endow undecidable sentences with realist truth 
conditions through the way that we use them. [(3)] Therefore, undecidable 
sentences do not have realist truth conditions” (Gifford, 2017: 88). See also 
(Dummett, 1978: 24). 
13. Michael Devitt is one of the most important commentators on Dummett’s 
anti-realist view. For Devitt, Dummett’s concern is whether statements of the one 
kind are determinately true or false (1983: 79). Devitt, however, sees the dispute 
between realism and anti-realism as an essentially metaphysical dispute, rather 
than a semantical one (see Devitt, 1997: 40). See also (Devitt, 1997, Chapter 2, 
especially 13-14; 1983). 
14. For more discussion, see (Miller, 2003a). 
15. We should note that one of the main consequences of Dummett’s anti-realistic 
view is a rejection of the principle of bivalence, according to which all well-
formed sentences in a particular discourse are determinately either true or false. 
See (Dummett, 1969: especially 246).  
16. See also (Dummett, 1979: 116).  
17. McDowell, in this paper, is originally responding to Dummett’s manifestation 
argument. See also (McDowell, 1989 and 1987). 
18. Miller (2002) draws a distinction between a “strong” and a “weak” version of 
the manifestation argument, and Byrne (2005) draws a parallel distinction 
between the “manifestation argument” and the “manifestation challenge”. 
Although it should be noted that this difference is essentially nothing more than a 
verbal one, it is important to take into account the fact that the manifestation 
argument (in Byrne’s terminology) or the strong version of the manifestation 
argument (in Miller’s) seeks to show the falsity of semantic realism; in contrast, 
the weak version of the manifestation argument or the manifestation challenge 
aims to establish the much more modest conclusion, according which we cannot 
accept or justify semantic realism solely on the basis of the practical abilities – 
introduced by realists – which constitute linguistic understanding. 
19. Faced with this challenge, a number of realists, for example Colin McGinn 
and Peter Strawson, suggests a variety of practical abilities to deal with this 
problem. For more, see (Miller, 2002: 358-362). 
201. Miller puts this point in a different way by saying that what Wright’s 
demand requires of the speakers seems to be that they must have a conception of 
something very theoretical, that they must “also manifest an understanding of 
realism” (Miller, 2002: 371). 
21. Wright is against Wittgenstein’s therapeutic approach (see, e.g. Wright, 
2001a, p.373; see also Wright, 2001b). Whether or not he is successful in this 
resistance against such an approach is a question that can be approached in a 
separate investigation. My point here is to raise the question whether Wright is 
justified to criticize McDowell’s response on a ground that is radically far from 
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McDowell’s philosophy. For McDowell, Wittgenstein’s therapeutic approach to 
philosophical perplexities is one of the most vital doctrines of the later 
Wittgenstein and an inseparable part of his own philosophy.] 
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